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SCREENING OUT UNWANTED CALLS:  
THE HYPOCRISY OF  
STANDING “DOCTRINE” 
Mark S. Brodin* 
Closing the doors of the court to a disinterested petitioner who gives warning 
of an unlawful governmental action is detrimental to the governance of the law, 
since where there is no judge—there is no law.—Justice Aharon Barak1 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice William Rehnquist put it best when he observed “ ‘[s]imple justice’ 
is achieved when a complex body of law developed over a period of years is 
evenhandedly applied.”2 This was of course the aspiration and expectation of 
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when they prefaced their 
innovation with the mandate that the rules “be construed and administered to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and pro-
ceeding.”3 Unfortunately, these noble ambitions have been betrayed of late as 
certain members of the Supreme Court, including Rehnquist himself, have bent 
and distorted rules and doctrine to fit their ideological agendas. No one could 
be unhappier about this state of affairs than Steve Subrin, whom we honor with 
this symposium, and who has devoted his illustrious fifty-year career to the 
construction and preservation of a workable framework for the pursuit of equal 
justice in our federal courts. 
Witnessing the dismantling of the great edifice that Dean Charles Clark 
and the other big thinkers and dreamers gave us in 1938, Professor Subrin has 
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1  HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defence 42(2) PD 441 ¶ 22 [1988] (Isr.), in PUBLIC 
LAW IN ISRAEL 275, 283 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996). 
2  Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (referring to finality doc-
trine) (emphasis added). 
3  FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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written eloquently about the demise of notice pleading,4 the restriction of plain-
tiffs’ rights under Title VII by way of ostensibly “technical” procedural deci-
sions regarding such matters as burden of proof and discovery,5 and (most pas-
sionately) the near-disappearance of the civil jury trial.6 While he remains con-
concerned about the transsubstantive (one of Steve’s favorite phrases) breadth 
of the FRCP, arguing against the “One Size Fits All” approach,7 far more 
threatening to the drafters’ conception of an ideal dispute resolution system is 
the peremptory closing of the courthouse door to disfavored litigants asserting 
disfavored causes. 
The problem is not new. Speaking on the 50th anniversary of the FRCP in 
1988, U.S. District Judge Jack Weinstein bemoaned the early skirmishes in the 
“anti-access movement” under the “ ‘disingenuous guises’ of ‘administrative 
efficiency’ and ‘a purported litigation explosion. ’ ”8 Specifically, he noted the 
negative impact of FRCP 11 on civil rights plaintiffs, the hostility to class ac-
tions, the summary judgment trilogy and heightened pleading requirements that 
were green-lighting the early dismissal of cases, and the restrictions on discov-
ery. U.S. District Judge Robert Carter shared the concern that efficiency was 
being used “as a smokescreen to hide a ‘substantive bias’ against cases [par-
ticularly civil rights claims] that efficiency proponents do not like.”9 
Like Judges Weinstein and Carter, Steve Subrin knows that “procedure” 
can produce a just result even when the “substantive law” is not up to the task. 
For instance, the City of Chicago between the World Wars was among the most 
racially segregated enclaves outside the Deep South, maintained largely 
through restrictive covenants in the white neighborhoods sponsored by the Chi-
cago Real Estate Board. It would not be until Shelley v. Kraemer10 in 1948 that 
the Supreme Court finally struck down these vile devices under the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accomplishing virtually the same 
result eight years earlier, Justice Harlan Fisk Stone invoked the procedural pro-
tections of the due process clause to overturn a class action decree that purport-
                                                        
4  Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and Ele-
mental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571 (2012). 
5  Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N. Subrin, Substance in the 
Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cas-
es, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211 (1992). For more on discovery, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and 
Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529 (2001). 
6  Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realis-
tic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399 (2011). 
7  Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting 
the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377 (2010). 
8  Stephen N. Subrin, Fireworks on the 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 73 JUDICATURE 4, 6 (1989). 
9  Id. at 7. 
10  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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ed to insulate the covenants from challenge.11 The headline in the Chicago 
newspaper the next day read “COURT HOLDS COVENANTS NON 
EXISTENT.”12 
Similarly, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath (another of 
Steve’s favorites),13 Goldberg v. Kelly,14 and Fuentes v. Shevin15 constrained 
the abuses of arbitrary executive and bureaucratic power through application of 
procedural due process, again at a time when enforceable substantive rights for 
the victims were lacking. 
But now, sadly, procedure has entered a less uplifting phase. Long ago, in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford,16 the Court declared that black persons, having no 
rights of a citizen, had no standing to sue in court for their freedom. Although 
that decision has earned its special ignominy in our history, it set a template for 
an exclusionary view of the federal courts whereby some seeking enforcement 
of our most basic rights are turned away before the merits of their cause are ev-
er aired, on the dubious grounds that they lack a sufficient stake in the outcome. 
As set out below, this power has been invoked quite selectively. 
I. THE NARROWING OF THE FEDERAL FORUM 
The troublesome “anti-access movement” that Judges Weinstein and Carter 
bemoaned in 1988 has gathered considerable steam since, with the erecting of 
what Professor Arthur Miller refers to as procedural stop signs that serve the 
economic or political agendas of powerful interest groups.17 
Notice pleading has been unceremoniously cast-off, first in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly18 in the interest (as Justice Souter acknowledged) of protect-
ing corporate defendants from the considerable expenses of discovery in anti-
trust actions; and then more broadly when post-9/11 civil rights abuses of the 
Bush administration were challenged in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.19 Pleadings that 
would easily satisfy Conley v. Gibson’s20 standard of fifty years vintage were 
suddenly found wanting, as judges displaced jurors in determining the “plausi-
bility” of plaintiffs’ claims, based not on evidence but merely the complaint 
                                                        
11  Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Stone ruled that the class of homeowners who had 
successfully sought to uphold the validity of the covenants could not properly bind those op-
posed to the covenants, effectively defanging enforcement. 
12  Enoch P. Waters, Hansberry Decision Opens 500 New Homes to Race: Court Holds Cov-
enants Non Existent, CHI. DEFENDER, Nov. 16, 1940, at 1. 
13  Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). 
14  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
15  Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
16  Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
17  Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Mer-
its: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 310 
(2013). 
18  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
19  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
20  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
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and their own “judicial experience and common sense,”21 whatever that means. 
The great innovation of liberal discovery is thus put out of reach for those 
plaintiffs who are most in need of it to establish the merits of their claim. Fact 
pleading, long discredited, is back in fashion. 
Justice Harlan’s sensible approach to the granting of summary judgment,22 
consistent with the drafters’ predilection for deciding cases on the merits after 
full consideration, has similarly been replaced by a defendant-friendly regime. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,23 allowing the defendant to secure summary judgment 
merely by calling the plaintiff’s bluff as to its evidence, just happened to bene-
fit the besieged asbestos industry, then under large-scale attack by injured vic-
tims and their families. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio24 fa-
cilitated summary judgment for antitrust defendants accused of conspiring to 
fix prices; no surprise, given that it was authored by the same Justice Lewis 
Powell who as a corporate lawyer penned the infamous memo to the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce calling for an aggressive campaign to shape American 
law to protect the “free enterprise system” from litigation.25 To so rule, as Jus-
tice White complained for the four dissenters, the Court was “overturning set-
tled law” by weighing the evidence, assessing the credibility of witnesses, and 
rejecting the plaintiffs’ expert economist’s opinion out of hand as “implausi-
ble.”26 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.27 similarly green-lighted what Justice 
Brennan described as “a brand new procedure [that] will transform what is 
meant to provide an expedited ‘summary’ procedure into a full-blown paper 
trial on the merits,” raising “grave concerns” about “the constitutional right of 
civil litigants to a jury trial.”28 
More recently, in a highly unusual move, the Court ordered summary 
judgment (without a remand) for the mostly white firefighter plaintiffs in a re-
verse discrimination case against the city of New Haven, notwithstanding clear 
disputes of fact in the evidence regarding the validity and disparate racial im-
pact of the challenged multiple-choice test for promotion in the fire depart-
                                                        
21  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
22  Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 153–61 (1970). 
23  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
24  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see also Stephen 
B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting To-
ward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591 (2004). 
25  Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Educ.  
Comm. Chair, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), available at 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/PowellMemorandumPrinted.pdf. 
26  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 600–01 (White, J., dissenting). 
27  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
28  Id. at 266–67 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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ment.29 Incredibly, this was done based on a record that was unsworn and utter-
ly failed to conform to FRCP 56(c) (requiring admissible evidence).30 
Summary judgment has thus morphed, as Professor Miller observes, from a 
motion for identifying trial-worthy issues to “the centerpiece and end-point for 
many (perhaps too many) federal civil cases.”31 
In the area of finality, hypocrisy reigns supreme (no pun intended). Wil-
liam Rehnquist usually demonstrated an abiding commitment to the concept 
that once a matter is finally decided, it is finally decided. In Federated Depart-
ment Stores v. Moitie, he emphatically dismissed the possibility of any excep-
tion to the doctrine of claim preclusion, even when, as in that case, a significant 
change in substantive law (by way of a Supreme Court decision) that benefits 
appealing parties is thus rendered unavailable to similarly-situated non-
appealing parties. Rehnquist insisted that res judicata must be strictly enforced 
as it “serves vital public interests beyond any individual judge’s ad hoc deter-
mination of the equities in a particular case.”32 “Public policy dictates that there 
be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound 
by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered for-
ever settled as between the parties.”33 Noble sentiments, indeed. 
Yet just three years later Rehnquist somehow did find an exception when 
he exempted the U.S. Government as litigant from the consequences of issue 
preclusion in United States v. Mendoza.34 This time the precluded party was not 
a class of bilked retail purchasers, but immigration authorities sued by Filipino 
World War II veterans whose promise of naturalization had been reneged upon. 
Skilled lawyer that he was, Rehnquist conveniently distinguished this case: 
A rule allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government in 
such cases would substantially thwart the development of important questions of 
law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue. Al-
lowing only one final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it re-
ceives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question 
before this Court grants certiorari.35 
But alas, it is still an exception to a doctrine that purportedly allows for no 
exceptions.36 
                                                        
29  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
30  See Mark S. Brodin, Ricci v. DeStefano: The New Haven Firefighters Case & the Tri-
umph of White Privilege, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 161, 183–88 (2011). 
31  Miller, supra note 17, at 311. 
32  Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981). 
33  Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931)). 
34  United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984). 
35  Id. at 160. 
36  Willie McCurry, plaintiff in a § 1983 action against police officers and the department for 
an allegedly unlawful search of his home and assault on his person, was bestowed no such 
favor by the Court when he was precluded from litigating by virtue of collateral estoppel 
arising from his motion to suppress in the state criminal trial. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 
(1980). Justice Blackmun, joined by Brennan and Marshall in dissent, found ample room for 
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Rehnquist would have also cut some slack in finality doctrine when a cor-
porate defendant was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of its se-
curities fraud based on the results of a prior bench trial. His dissent in Parklane 
Hosiery Co. v. Shore37 argued that Parklane’s Seventh Amendment right to re-
try the issue before a jury trumped collateral estoppel. 
However, Rehnquist reemerged as the champion of finality in his 1993 
opinion for the Court in Herrera v. Collins,38 ruling that a defendant under 
death sentence for the murder of a police officer could not pursue a habeas cor-
pus petition based on a claim of actual innocence demonstrated by newly dis-
covered evidence “because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims 
of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the 
enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would 
place on the States.”39 
There is hardly any more disruptive effect on finality than to permit final 
decrees to be reopened at any time by any person impacted. Yet that is precise-
ly what the Court (per William Rehnquist) did when it allowed a group of white 
firefighters in Birmingham, Alabama (dubbed “Bombingham” because of its 
violent opposition to desegregation and the civil rights movement40) to collater-
ally attack and ultimately overturn consent decrees entered in an earlier case 
providing goals for minority hiring in the department.41 The decrees had been 
agreed upon between the parties (the NAACP and the City) after findings of 
discrimination had been made by the District Court, ending decades of litiga-
tion.42 
The white plaintiffs in Martin v. Wilks had been aware of the proposed de-
crees in the prior litigation but failed to intervene or appear at the fair hearing 
held before the decrees were entered.43 The firefighters union and several other 
                                                                                                                                
an exception in the clear legislative history of the civil rights statute—to provide a federal 
forum for persons alleging abuse by state actors—as well as the inequity of foreclosing the 
civil damages action based on findings from the suppression hearing, where McCurry was an 
“involuntary litigant.” Id. at 116 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
37  Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
38  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
39  Id. at 417. Speaking for himself, Stevens, and Souter, Justice Blackmun stated the obvi-
ous: “I believe it contrary to any standard of decency to execute someone who is actually 
innocent.” Id. at 435 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But in Rehnquist’s calculus, the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial in a civil action was more weighty than a criminal defend-
ant’s right to avoid execution by proving his innocence. 
40  Mark S. Brodin, The Fraudulent Case Against Affirmative Action—The Untold Story Be-
hind Fisher v. University of Texas, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 237, 256 (2014). 
41  Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
42  See id. at 776 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
43  For the four dissenters, such persons who chose to “remain on the sidelines” run the risk 
that “they may be harmed as a practical matter even though their legal rights are unaffected.” 
Id. at 769–70. 
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white firefighters did appear and objected, taking the same positions now as-
serted by the Martin plaintiffs.44 
Overturning the then universally recognized impermissible collateral attack 
doctrine,45 Rehnquist exhibited none of his usual concern for orderly closing of 
matters. What followed, predictably, was an onslaught of “reverse discrimina-
tion” challenges to final decrees around the nation.46 The Washington Post la-
mented “the chaos of interminable litigation” engendered by Martin v. Wilks.47 
Indeed, In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation 
dragged on for five more years, culminating in the overturning of the 1981 con-
sent decrees that were at last beginning to integrate the supervisory ranks of the 
fire department.48 It is difficult to imagine any other context in which the five 
conservative, finality-booster justices would have entertained such heterodoxy. 
It is telling that numerous amicus briefs were filed in support of Birming-
ham by dozens of groups representing municipalities and states, as well as thir-
ty-two states themselves and the District of Columbia. One representative brief 
urged that: 
Should respondents’ collateral attack on the consent decrees be permitted to 
proceed, state and local governments sued as employers under Title VII could 
not confidently negotiate and execute consent decrees containing race-conscious 
relief, even following actual notice and an opportunity to be heard by all inter-
ested parties. Every selection decision made pursuant to such a decree could 
subject the employer to claims from disappointed employees or applicants seek-
ing to challenge the decree upon which the personnel action was based. Gov-
ernment personnel practices thus would remain in an unacceptable state of un-
certainty, and scarce funds would be diverted from other governmental needs to 
cover litigation costs as well as potential settlements and judgments. The inevi-
table effect would be to discourage public employers from entering into judicial-
ly approved settlements of Title VII litigation, thereby frustrating Congress’s 
preference for voluntary compliance as a primary means to enforce Title VII.49 
                                                        
44  Id. at 759 (majority opinion). 
45  See id. at 762 n.3. 
46  See Brodin, supra note 40, at 258. 
47  Id. The dissenters shared that view: “Such a broad allowance of collateral review would 
destroy the integrity of litigated judgments, would lead to an abundance of vexatious litiga-
tion, and would subvert the interest in comity between courts.” Martin, 490 U.S. at 783 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). 
48  Bennett v. Arrington (In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Emp’t Litig.), 20 F.3d 
1525 (11th Cir. 1994). Congress legislatively overruled the Court in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991. Section 108 disallows challenges to a litigated or consent judgment by any person who 
had notice of the proposed judgment and an opportunity to present objections, or whose in-
terests were adequately represented by a party in the prior case. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075. This would have precluded the collateral attack 
in Martin v. Wilks. 
49  Brief of Nat’l League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–3, 
Martin, 490 U.S. 75 (No. 87-1614), 1988 WL 1025890. 
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Ironically, Justice Anthony Kennedy blatantly disregarded the “deep-
rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court,”50 the 
very core justification for the result in Martin v. Wilks, when in Ricci v. DeSte-
fano, noted above, he purported to foreclose all future challenges to the dis-
criminatory impact of the promotion test by non-party minority firefighters.51 
Another favorite litigation-terminator of conservatives on the bench is dis-
missal for lack of personal jurisdiction. In an evolution all too familiar to 1Ls, 
Harlan Fisk Stone brought the doctrine into the modern age in International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington,52 recognizing the anachronism of requiring physical 
presence in an age of robust interstate commerce and easy transportation. In-
creasingly, however, the Court has tightened the minimum contacts standard to 
throw plaintiffs out of court unless their corporate defendants drew a clear 
straight line of deliberate and purposeful connections to the forum state. 
The undoing of Stone’s construct, which endured for nearly fifty years, and 
of the “stream of commerce” theory that flowed from it, culminated in J. McIn-
tyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, where to the shock of dissenting Justices 
Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Anthony Kennedy concluded it would vio-
late the due process rights of a British manufacturer, whose allegedly danger-
ous metal-shearing machine injured a worker in New Jersey, to subject it to suit 
in that state.53 McIntyre had cleverly interposed an American distributor (with 
the same name) to market and sell in the States. Kennedy’s opinion adopts a 
feudal notion of jurisdiction, premised on an assessment of whether the defend-
ant submitted to the sovereign’s power. He invokes the term “submission” so 
many times that a law review article on the case could justly be titled “J. McIn-
tyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro: Fifty Shades of Jurisdiction.” 
In short, the Court has been refashioning our procedural system to be in-
creasingly anti-consumer, anti-civil rights, and pro-business.54 Judge Patricia 
Wald has lamented that “[w]e are approaching a time when a civil trial will be 
thought of as a ‘pathological event.’ ”55 “While judges appear to be requiring 
plaintiffs to plead facts with ever greater detail in order to survive motions to 
                                                        
50  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 
U.S. 793, 798 (1996)). 
51  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009); see Brodin, supra note 30, at 188–91. The 
Second Circuit saw things differently on remand. Citing Martin v. Wilks, it ruled that the 
non-party firefighter Michael Briscoe could not be precluded from litigating his own dispar-
ate impact action. Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 204–05 (2d Cir. 2011). 
52  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). “Stream of commerce” theory had 
further expanded the reach of courts, although it was applied parsimoniously. See Asahi 
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
53  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). The Court has found jurisdic-
tion lacking in all its recent decisions. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Daimler 
AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
54  See generally Stempel, supra note 5. 
55  Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1915 (1998). 
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dismiss, they also seem reluctant to find genuine issues of material fact merit-
ing a trial.”56 We are living now, as Arthur Miller puts it, in a “dismissal cul-
ture.”57 
II. STANDING “DOCTRINE” AND THE AVOIDANCE OF UNWANTED CASES 
Gene Nichol Jr. began his 1984 article, Rethinking Standing, with a quote 
from Justice Rehnquist: “We need not mince words when we say that the con-
cept of ‘Art. III standing’ has not been defined with complete consistency 
. . . .”58 Professor Nichol was troubled by the inconsistency of results, and the 
practice of courts “peering beyond preliminary access issues” and into the mer-
its of the actions in the guise of determining whether the plaintiff had “such a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” to justify proceeding.59 In the 
decades since, mere inconsistency has given way to cynical manipulation in 
apparent conformity with an agenda to deny the federal forum to disfavored 
plaintiffs and causes.60 
The origins of the current restrictive view of standing to sue can be traced 
to a series of cases in the 1970s and 1980s (when the Court began its rightward 
shift) that were dismissed at the outset for failure of the plaintiffs to satisfy the 
Court that: 1) they suffered personally some actual or threatened injury, 2) the 
injury was traceable to the allegedly illegal conduct of the defendant, and 3) the 
injury could likely be redressed by a favorable decision.61 The courthouse door 
was thus closed to advocates for low-income housing challenging exclusionary 
zoning provisions;62 to claims on behalf of indigents and welfare rights organi-
                                                        
56  Id. at 1942. 
57  Miller, supra note 17, at 358. 
58  Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 68 (1984) (quoting Val-
ley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 475 (1982)). Rehnquist conceded similar inconsistency in the closely related area of the 
adequacy of a class representative. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 263 n.15 (2003). 
59  Nichol, supra note 58, at 69, 71. 
60  See Heather Elliott, Further Standing Lessons, 89 IND. L.J. SUPP. 17 (2014) (discussing 
the challenges to the Affordable Care Act, the Defense of Marriage Act, and California’s ban 
on same-sex marriage). Elliott observes: 
[I]n Windsor [the Court found] standing and [went] on to strike down portions of the federal De-
fense of Marriage Act (DOMA) on the merits, yet in Perry [it found] no standing to review Cali-
fornia’s ban on same-sex marriage. Given extensive similarities in the procedural posture of both 
cases, the different standing outcomes are hard to reconcile. The unfortunate explanation for the 
differing outcomes is political: the Court wanted to get the federal government out of the mar-
riage equality debate and leave it for the States. Thus the Court found standing and reached the 
merits in the DOMA case, while finding no jurisdiction in the California case. Unfortunately for 
standing doctrine, these results don’t make sense. 
Id. at 25 (footnotes omitted); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 
90 DENV. U. L. REV. 317 (2012) (discussing Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization 
v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011), in which the Court divided on ideological lines to deny stand-
ing to opponents of tax credits for parochial schools). 
61  Nichol, supra note 58, at 71. 
62  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Justice Brennan chided the majority for “toss[ing] 
out of court almost every conceivable kind of plaintiff [two local fair housing groups, low-
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zations challenging an IRS ruling granting favorable tax treatment to hospitals 
denying indigents medical services;63 to nursing home residents and Medicaid 
recipients complaining of a reduction in their level of care;64 to litigants chal-
lenging systemic use of chokeholds by police in Los Angeles;65 and to the 
mother of an illegitimate child challenging the discriminatory enforcement of 
the Texas child support statute.66 Contrast the recognized standing of the holder 
of even a single share to vindicate the corporation’s claims in a derivative ac-
tion despite the shareholder’s negligible personal stake in the action.67 
Close reading of these decisions suggests that no plaintiff would have 
standing to challenge any of these policies, which thus evade review, and all of 
which happen to be in close sync with the agenda of the political right. As Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall complained in Lyons: “Since no one can show that he 
will be choked in the future, no one—not even a person who, like Lyons, has 
almost been choked to death—has standing to challenge the continuation of the 
policy.”68 Indeed, in a moment of candor, Justice White agreed when he re-
                                                                                                                                
income and minority residents, and taxpayers]” who could possibly challenge a town’s re-
strictive zoning ordinance, which he asserted “can be explained only by an indefensible hos-
tility to the claim on the merits.” Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court, Brennan 
lamented, had turned “the very success of the allegedly unconstitutional scheme into a barri-
er to a lawsuit seeking its invalidation.” Id. at 523. 
63  Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). The case was thrown out on 
the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that changing the Ruling would assure 
them the services they sought, as the hospitals might forgo the tax advantage, a result Justice 
Brennan complained defied both logic and precedent. Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
64  Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). 
65  City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). At least 16 persons, mostly African-American 
males, had died following use of chokeholds by the LAPD, pursuant to a policy the district 
court found permitted their use even in situations where there was no threat of violence. Id. 
at 115–16, 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Overturning injunctive relief ordered below, the 
Court ruled that Lyons, who had been choked into unconsciousness by police when stopped 
for a routine traffic violation, failed to show an imminent threat that he would be subject to 
such conduct again. 
The Court relied on O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), which had similarly over-
turned injunctive relief awarded to a class of civil rights plaintiffs complaining about racially 
discriminatory enforcement of the criminal law by judges in Cairo, Illinois. Justice Douglas 
characterized the case in his dissent: 
What has been alleged here is not only wrongs done to named plaintiffs, but a recurring 
pattern of wrongs which establishes, if proved, that the legal regime under control of the whites 
in Cairo, Illinois, is used over and over again to keep the blacks from exercising First Amend-
ment rights, to discriminate against them, to keep from the blacks the protection of the law in 
their lawful activities, to weight the scales of justice repeatedly on the side of white prejudices 
and against black protests, fears, and suffering. This is a more pervasive scheme for suppression 
of blacks and their civil rights than I have ever seen. It may not survive a trial. But if this case 
does not present a “case or controversy” involving the named plaintiffs, then that concept has 
been so watered down as to be no longer recognizable. This will please the white superstructure, 
but it does violence to the conception of evenhanded justice envisioned by the Constitution. 
O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 509. 
66  Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
67  12B FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5909 (perm. ed. 
2014). 
68  Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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vealed the real agenda behind that dismissal, contending that “[a] federal court, 
however, is not the proper forum to press such claims.”69 
The plaintiffs who have given their names to the familiar line of “reverse 
discrimination” cases which have severely curtailed race-conscious preference, 
on the other hand, were much more obviously unable to establish their own 
standing based on the these precedents.70 The Court, nonetheless, chose to en-
tertain each of the cases.71 
Alan Bakke could not persuasively connect his rejection from U.C. Davis 
Medical School to the affirmative action program he challenged.72 At thirty-
three, he was well over the typical age of entering medical students, and he in-
terviewed poorly at Davis. Indeed, he was unsuccessful with at least eleven 
other medical schools he applied to.73 Yet U.C. Davis inexplicably abandoned 
its original position, which had prevailed in the district court, that Bakke would 
not have been admitted in any event (without any minority set-aside) and thus 
lacked standing to sue.74 
Barbara Grutter and Jennifer Gratz, whose cases set the benchmarks for 
race-conscious programs before Fisher v. University of Texas,75 were both be-
low the profile of successful applicants and thus unlikely admits even under a 
race-blind program.76 And most recently Abigail Fisher, hailed in much of the 
media as a victim of reverse racism, graduated eighty-second in her high school 
class of 674 (and thus could not be admitted under Texas’s Top Ten Percent 
Law). With a mediocre 1180 (out of 1600) on her SATs (below the 80th per-
centile), there were 168 minority applicants with higher index numbers than 
Fisher who were also denied admission.77 
The University of Texas argued that Fisher lacked standing to bring her ac-
tion, and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor raised that obvious problem early in 
the oral argument,78 noting that in 1999 the Court had dismissed a similar case 
for lack of standing when the plaintiff applicant could not show he would have 
                                                        
69  Id. at 111–12 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
70  See Juan F. Perea, Doctrines of Delusion: Bakke, Fisher and the Case for a New Affirma-
tive Action 41 (Loyola Univ. Chi. Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 2013-022, 2013), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2312630. 
71  Only DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), was dismissed for mootness. DeFunis 
was already in his last semester at University of Washington Law School, having been or-
dered admitted by the district court three years before when he filed the case. DeFunis, 416 
U.S. at 319–20. 
72  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see HOWARD BALL, THE BAKKE 
CASE: RACE, EDUCATION, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 54–56 (2000). 
73  Brodin, supra note 40, at 264 n.144; Perea, supra note 70, at 41. 
74  Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Ad-
missions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1073, 1094 (2002). 
75  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
76  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); see 
Liu, supra note 74, at 1073; Perea, supra note 70, at 42. 
77  Brodin, supra note 40, at 264–65. 
78  Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–8, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411. 
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been selected for the PhD program even absent its racial preference. In Texas v. 
Lesage the Court had insisted: “Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a dis-
crete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it 
is undisputed that the government would have made the same decision regard-
less, there is no cognizable injury . . . .”79 
But Texas v. Lesage conveniently provided reverse discrimination plain-
tiffs with a work-around to their standing problem: “Of course, a plaintiff who 
challenges an ongoing race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking re-
lief need not affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in ques-
tion if race were not considered. The relevant injury in such cases is ‘the inabil-
ity to compete on an equal footing.’ ”80 The same stretched reasoning permitted 
the Court to ignore Alan Bakke’s inability to show that his rejection from U.C. 
Davis could be traced to the minority set-aside, or that his “injury” could be re-
dressed by a favorable decision forbidding it.81 
William Rehnquist, an architect of the narrow entry door to federal court, 
was nonetheless able to confer standing in Gratz v. Bollinger on two plaintiffs 
who, having been rejected from the University of Michigan, enrolled at and 
graduated from other universities. One sought to challenge the transfer admis-
sions program despite never having applied to transfer to the University of 
Michigan. It was sufficient, Rehnquist asserted, that he stood “able and ready” 
to apply as soon as the University ceased its racial preference.82 
Applying the very precedents established by Rehnquist and his conserva-
tive colleagues, these reverse discrimination plaintiffs would have been booted 
out, as Justice Stevens (joined by Souter and Ginsburg) would have held in 
Gratz.83 The two plaintiffs’ graduation from other schools without ever apply-
ing for transfer to Michigan rendered any alleged injury from the selection pro-
cess purely conjectural, in the dissenters’ view, and should have defeated the 
plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief. “There is,” Stevens observed, “a total ab-
sence of evidence that either petitioner would receive any benefit from the pro-
spective relief sought by their lawyer.”84 Thus, 
like the plaintiff in Los Angeles v. Lyons, who had standing to recover damages 
caused by “chokeholds” administered by the police in the past but had no stand-
                                                        
79  Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999). 
80  Id. (emphasis added). This rationale could have similarly conferred standing on the un-
successful plaintiffs in each of the above cases dismissed—i.e., the indigents and nursing 
home residents had a right to equal medical treatment, the low-income housing advocates to 
non-discriminatory zoning, and the journalists and lawyers in Clapper, discussed below, to 
free-exchange of communications without fear of snooping. 
81  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978). 
82  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 262 (2003). The same logic did not apply to prospective 
minority students who sought to intervene, but were denied by the district court on the 
grounds they failed to allege a legally protectable interest. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999). 
83  Gratz, 539 U.S. at 285 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
84  Id. at 282. 
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ing to seek injunctive relief preventing future chokeholds, petitioners’ past inju-
ries do not give them standing to obtain injunctive relief to protect third parties 
from similar harms. To seek forward-looking, injunctive relief, petitioners must 
show that they face an imminent threat of future injury.85 
Justice O’Connor recognized in Grutter that it is in the nature of competi-
tive university admissions that even high index numbers do not assure admis-
sion any more than low numbers automatically disqualify the applicant.86 The 
process is far too complex and nuanced to reliably predict results. Indeed, one 
writer has concluded that, statistically, minority preferences and rejection of 
white applicants “are largely independent events, improperly linked through the 
causation fallacy,” generally undercutting the standing of reverse discrimina-
tion plaintiffs to sue.87 
Abigail Fisher’s attorney was able to take advantage of the “but-we-like-
reverse-discrimination-cases” loophole, contending she had the right to be 
judged by a completely race-blind process.88 And Anthony Kennedy’s opinion 
for the Court fails to even mention the standing issue, a threshold requirement 
of justiciability. 
The Court’s selective open door policy has extended to challenges to mi-
nority set-asides as well. Both Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña89 (opinion 
by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor) and Northeastern Florida Chapter, Associat-
ed General Contractors v. City of Jacksonville90 (opinion by Justice Clarence 
Thomas) conferred standing on plaintiffs even in the absence of any showing 
that they would have obtained a contract notwithstanding the challenged pref-
erence. Again, injury in fact was found in “the inability to compete on an equal 
footing in the bidding process, not the loss of a contract.”91 It was sufficient for 
Adarand, in seeking forward-looking relief against all such set-asides, to allege 
simply that it was “very likely” to bid on another government contract in the 
relatively near future.92 
                                                        
85  Id. at 284 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As Justice Souter complained, “the Court 
thus ignores the basic principle of Article III standing that a plaintiff cannot challenge a gov-
ernment program that does not apply to him.” Id. at 292 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
86  Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 315 (2003). 
87  Liu, supra note 74, at 1049. 
88  See Ronald Dworkin, The Case Against Color-Blind Admissions, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,  
Dec. 20, 2012, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/dec/20 
/case-against-color-blind-admissions/. 
89  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
90  Ne. Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 
(1993). 
91  Id. at 666; see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211. Clarence Thomas attempted to distinguish 
Warth v. Seldin on the grounds that in that case, the low-income housing advocates did not 
explicitly allege that they had been prevented from “competing on an equal footing.” See 
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 667–668. To base constitutional doctrine on so constrained a read-
ing of a complaint, the import of which was clearly a challenge to the inability to compete, is 
to cynically rest on the thinnest of reeds. 
92  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 212. 
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Additionally, when serious standing questions were raised by school dis-
tricts whose student assignment plans (which they had already voluntarily 
abandoned) were challenged because they included racial classifications de-
signed to further desegregation, the Court, per Chief Justice Roberts, dismissed 
them. The parents were permitted to proceed despite the fact that their children 
would not be affected unless they applied to attend certain oversubscribed 
schools, thus rendering any possible injury speculative—but the right at stake, 
Roberts asserted, was the newly recognized right not to be forced to compete in 
a race-based system.93 
Thus, whenever necessary to impose its ideology of “color-blindness” and 
hostility to race-preference, the Roberts Court tosses aside all its usual concerns 
about justiciability. So too when the Court allowed to proceed a challenge to 
Ohio’s law banning lies in political campaigns, brought by antiabortion and an-
ti-“Obama Care” groups. It had been dismissed by the Sixth Circuit for lack of 
standing when the threat of prosecution was terminated.94 
*   *   * 
The logic of the race preference cases should have afforded standing to the 
journalists, media organizations, attorneys, and human rights activists who 
challenged the federal government’s omnibus electronic surveillance program 
in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.95 Do they not have the right to pur-
sue their professions without fear of surreptitious monitoring of their every 
communication?96 
But discounting their daily participation in sensitive international commu-
nications with likely targets of foreign intelligence surveillance (as set forth in 
affidavits), the Court (per a five-to-four opinion written by Justice Alito) over-
turned the Second Circuit’s finding that they presented both an “objectively 
                                                        
93  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007). The plaintiff in 
the companion case against the Jefferson County Board of Education had already been 
granted the transfer he was seeking, but Roberts noted “he may again be subject to assign-
ment based on his race” in the future. Id. at 719–20 (emphasis added). 
94  Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014). 
95  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). See generally Liz Clark Rinehart, 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA: Allowing the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to Turn 
“Incidentally” into “Certainly”, 73 MD. L. REV. 1018 (2014). 
96  The notion that recasting the standing issue as the right to engage in a market undistorted 
by unconstitutional conduct is explored by Professor Maxwell L. Stearns in Grains of Sand 
or Butterfly Effect: Standing, the Legitimacy of Precedent, and Reflections on Hollingsworth 
and Windsor, 65 ALA. L. REV. 349, 367–69 (2013). He compares Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737 (1984), denying standing to African American parents challenging the IRS policy con-
ferring tax-exempt status on schools practicing racial discrimination, with Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), permitting Bakke to pursue his chal-
lenge to the set-aside program for minority applicants notwithstanding evidence he would 
not have been admitted in any event. Stearns convincingly demonstrates that both scenarios 
involved the same kind of contingent links between challenged conduct and redress, yet the 
Court came to opposite conclusions by manipulating the chains. 
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reasonable likelihood”97 that their communications will be intercepted and a 
present injury in having to take costly and burdensome protective measures to 
avoid that risk. Instead, characterizing the plaintiffs’ fears as merely “specula-
tive,”98 as they (of course) had no “actual knowledge” of the secret program’s 
targets, and unrealistically requiring a showing of “certainly impending inter-
ception,” the Court dismissed for lack of standing: 
[R]espondents’ argument rests on their highly speculative fear that: (1) the Gov-
ernment will decide to target the communications of non-U.S. persons with 
whom they communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to invoke 
its authority under [the challenged provision] rather than utilizing another meth-
od of surveillance; (3) the Article III judges who serve on the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court will conclude that the Government’s proposed surveil-
lance procedures satisfy [the challenged provision’s] many safeguards and are 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (4) the Government will succeed in in-
tercepting the communications of respondents’ contacts; and (5) respondents 
will be parties to the particular communications that the Government intercepts. 
. . . [R]espondents’ theory of standing, which relies on a highly attenuated chain 
of possibilities, does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be 
certainly impending.99 
Absent evidence that specific communications of specific plaintiffs were 
being (or would be) intercepted under the specific (and secret) FISA provision, 
the case could not proceed, thus effectively insulating the surveillance program 
(and presumably all other similar ones) from judicial scrutiny. The majority’s 
suggestion that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court provides judicial 
review of the surveillance program and protection of Fourth Amendment 
rights100 is laughable, given the secret and ex parte nature of its proceedings 
and its rubber-stamping of virtually all government applications for surveil-
lance.101 
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Breyer observed that the “Court has of-
ten found the occurrence of similar future events sufficiently certain to support 
standing” and “has often found standing where the occurrence of the relevant 
injury was far less certain than here.”102 He rejected the notion that plaintiffs’ 
                                                        
97  Amnesty Int’l v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 134 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1138 
(2013). 
98  As Stephen I. Vladeck notes, the only reason the plaintiffs’ allegations were “speculative” 
was because the challenged surveillance was secretive. Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and 
Secret Surveillance, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 551, 565 (2014). As Catch-22s go, 
this one is pretty good. 
99  Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148. The Court rejected plaintiffs’ suggestion at oral argument 
that the Government disclose in an in camera proceeding whether it was intercepting plain-
tiffs’ communications. Id. at 1149 n.4. 
100  Id. at 1154. 
101  Id. at 1159 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
102  Id. at 1155, 1161. As the Second Circuit has observed, “[t]he Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence regarding how imminent a threat must be in order to support standing, however, has 
been less than clear.” Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (dismissing for 
lack of standing challenge brought by writers, journalists, and activists challenging Presi-
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fears were “speculative” by demonstrating the high and realistic likelihood that 
at least some of the plaintiffs’ communications would be intercepted under the 
challenged program.103 
Breyer pointed to several prior decisions in which standing was found even 
though injury was far more speculative than in Clapper.104 Landlords in Pen-
nell v. City of San Jose were permitted to challenge a rent control ordinance de-
spite the many contingencies that would have to occur before they suffered any 
loss.105 Nursing home residents in Blum v. Yaretsky were permitted to challenge 
a Medicaid regulation allowing their transfer to a less desirable setting even 
though such transfers had been enjoined and the nursing home had not threat-
ened to transfer any plaintiff.106 
In Davis v. Federal Election Commission a candidate was conferred stand-
ing to challenge an election law that relaxed limits on an opponent’s contribu-
tions, even though his opponent had opted not to take advantage of the provi-
sion.107 In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 
plaintiffs were permitted to pursue a challenge to a statute that limited the lia-
bility of nuclear power plants, asserting that the proposed plant nearby would 
not be built without that provision, and, if built, might harm them by emitting 
radiation into the environment.108 The Court premised their standing on the un-
certainties and apprehensions surrounding radiation. 
And in a scenario quite similar to Clapper, farmers had standing to chal-
lenge deregulation of genetically modified crops on the assertion that their 
neighbors would plant such crops, and the farmers would suffer present harm in 
their efforts to protect against contamination as well as their need to conduct 
testing to determine whether their own plants had been contaminated as a re-
sult.109 Where a member of the California State Senate sued to challenge the 
characterization of three Canadian films (dealing with nuclear war and acid 
rain) he sought to exhibit to constituents as “foreign political propaganda,” he 
was deemed to have standing because of the potential harm to his reputation if 
he went ahead with his plan. Again, the Court ruled that the steps he would 
need to take to minimize the risk would themselves constitute cognizable inju-
ry.110 Yet the Court rejected the Clapper plaintiffs’ similar claim that they 
would have to take burdensome protective measures to avoid the risk of their 
                                                                                                                                
dent’s authority to detain persons for “substantial support” of terrorists, for lack of imminent 
threat to plaintiffs). Clapper “made clear that plaintiffs cannot establish standing on the basis 
of speculation about how the government may choose to utilize its authority to engage in 
foreign surveillance.” Id. at 201. 
103  Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
104  Id. at 1161–62. 
105  Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988). 
106  Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). 
107  Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
108  Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
109  Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010). 
110  Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 475 (1987). 
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communications being acquired under the surveillance program, like traveling 
to meet with foreign clients and sources in person.111 
In its more candid moments, the Court has conceded that the matter of 
standing “is one of degree, of course, and is not discernible by any precise 
test.”112 The gist is that the litigant must demonstrate “a realistic danger of sus-
taining a direct injury” as a result of the challenged action in order to assure a 
real controversy.113 But although inconsistency rules in this area, could there be 
any doubt that the Clapper plaintiffs would have pursued their cause with the 
greatest of energy and “vigorous advocacy,”114 assuring a concrete “case or 
controversy?”115 
These journalists, lawyers, and human rights activists were, as the Second 
Circuit observed, 
unlike most Americans, [because] they engage in legitimate professional activi-
ties that make it reasonably likely that their privacy will be invaded and their 
conversations [some privileged] overheard—unconstitutionally, or so they ar-
gue—as a result of the surveillance newly authorized by the [FISA Amendments 
of 2008], and that they have already suffered tangible, indirect injury due to the 
reasonable steps they have undertaken to avoid such overhearing, which would 
impair their ability to carry out those activities.116 
They were a far cry from the wildlife activist plaintiffs seeking protection 
for endangered species in foreign lands, dismissed for lack of standing because 
their plans to visit those lands were indeterminate and speculative—whose 
“some day” intentions were too thin to base their challenge upon.117 
The Clapper majority underscores that standing analysis is “especially rig-
orous” when plaintiffs challenge executive action alleged to be unconstitutional 
(thus raising separation of powers issues),118 and in the highly sensitive matter 
of foreign intelligence.119 Yet since Clapper was dismissed, the dramatic reve-
lations by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden of the massive Orwellian 
nature of the surveillance program, largely confirmed by the authorities, vindi-
cate the dissenters’ view of the likelihood (if not certainty) that at least some 
                                                        
111  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150–51 (2013). 
112  Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979). 
113  Id. at 298. 
114  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
115  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
116  Amnesty Int’l v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 149 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1138 
(2013). 
117  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564. 
118  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147; see Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. 
Amnesty International: Two or Three Competing Philosophies of Standing Law?, 81 TENN. 
L. REV. 211, 242–45 (2014). Thirty years ago Antonin Scalia published The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, arguing standing acts to pre-
vent the “overjudicialization of the processes of self-governance,” and in particular interfer-
ence in the President’s role. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Ele-
ment of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983). 
119  Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. 
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plaintiffs were in fact monitored, and without judicial oversight.120 In fact it is 
now clear that American lawyers’ confidential attorney-client communications 
have been intercepted,121 prompting one legal ethics expert to lament, “[y]ou 
run out of options very quickly to communicate with [clients] overseas. . . . 
[L]awyers are in a difficult spot to ensure that all of the information remains in 
confidence.”122 
The NSA’s dragnet also “threatens to put journalists under a cloud of sus-
picion and to expose them to routine spying by government agencies. By stor-
ing mass data for long periods, the NSA could develop the capability to recre-
ate a reporter’s research, retrace a source’s movements and listen in on past 
communications . . . .”123 
So much for the Court’s characterization of the Clapper plaintiffs’ claims 
as purely “speculative.” Yet, remarkably, the Government continues to seek 
dismissal of actions challenging the NSA bulk metadata collection, citing Am-
nesty International v. Clapper, and asserting that plaintiffs still cannot demon-
strate how the information collected is being used.124 Now that the cat is out of 
the bag, so to speak, the lower courts have been less receptive to such argu-
ments.125 
                                                        
120  See Charlie Savage, Broader Sifting of Message Data by N.S.A. Is Seen, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 8, 2013, at A1; Jameel Jaffer & Patrick C. Toomey, How the Government Misled  
the Supreme Court on Warrantless Wiretapping, THE NATION, (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/177649/. 
121  James Risen & Laura Poitras, Spying by N.S.A. Ally Entangled U.S. Law Firm, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2014, at A1 (revealing that an American law firm was monitored while rep-
resenting the Indonesian government in talks with the United States). 
122  Id. The ABA has since asked NSA to disclose the policies in place to protect attorney-
client communications. Press Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA Asks NSA How It Handles At-
torney-Client Privileged Information in Intelligence Work (Feb. 21, 2014), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-
archives/2014/02/aba_asks_nsa_howit.html. 
123  Ed Pilkington, NSA Actions Pose “Direct Threat to Journalism” Leading Watchdog 
Warns, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb 
/12/nsa-direct-threat-journalism-cpj-report. “The National Security Agency’s dragnet of 
communications data poses a direct threat to journalism in the digital age by threatening to 
destroy the confidence between reporter and source on which most investigations depend, 
one of the world’s leading journalism watchdogs has warned.” Id. 
124  See Government Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss at 9, Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 13-0881), 2014 WL 125887; Defendants’ Memorandum of 
Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 10, ACLU v. Clap-
per, 959 F.Supp.2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13-3994), 2013 WL 5744828 (“Plaintiffs’ mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction is based entirely on conjecture as to how the Government 
might misuse telephony metadata collected under the program, and consequences that might 
ensue.”). 
125  Despite government lawyers “[s]training mightily to find a reason that plaintiffs nonethe-
less lack standing” even in the face of the post-Clapper revelations, District Judge Richard 
Leon found that the telecommunication subscribers could pursue their Fourth Amendment 
challenge to the then-acknowledged wholesale collection of phone data in Klayman, 957 F. 
Supp. 2d at 26–29.  
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But if the Supreme Court continues to insist that plaintiffs identify specific 
communications of theirs that have been accessed under specific provisions of 
intelligence law, the Clapper result will stand. And with the Clapper bar set so 
unrealistically high, what are the prospects for challenging any government 
program that is not entirely transparent, and in the absence of an Edward 
Snowden to unveil the dark side? The government appears to get a pass from 
the Court on any program that remains covert. 
The dismissal in Clapper evidenced the same constricted tunnel-vision that 
the Court exhibited when it overturned a district court order granting President 
Bill Clinton temporary immunity from the sex harassment civil action filed by 
Paula Corbin Jones.126 Concluding that there was no reason to be concerned 
that the civil action would interfere in the President’s conduct of his office, or 
that it would degenerate into politically motivated harassing litigation, the 
Court allowed the case to proceed unimpeded.127 Within eighteen months, the 
Jones lawsuit had spawned the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and Clinton was im-
peached on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice. The Senate ultimately 
acquitted him.128 Although the final chapters in this saga were certainly unfore-
seeable, the Court’s naiveté in throwing a sitting president into the political 
minefield of a sex harassment lawsuit was breathtaking. 
But of course this was also the group that believed unlimited corporate 
contributions to politicians would not corrupt the system, or cause the elec-
                                                                                                                                
[W]hereas the plaintiffs in Clapper could only speculate as to whether they would be surveilled 
at all, plaintiffs in this case can point to strong evidence that, as Verizon customers, their teleph-
ony metadata has been collected for the last seven years (and stored for the last five) and will 
continue to be collected barring judicial or legislative intervention. 
Id. at 26. In ACLU v. Clapper, District Judge William Pauley also found that the ACLU had 
standing to challenge the metadata collection program. He nonetheless undercut the signifi-
cance of this ruling when he dismissed as speculative the claim that the Government would 
actually access and retrieve the organization’s telephone calls without reasonable suspicion. 
ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 738, 754. 
126  Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708–09 (1997). 
127  Id. at 708. 
Other than the fact that a trial may consume some of the President’s time and attention, there is 
nothing in the record to enable a judge to assess the potential harm that may ensue from schedul-
ing the trial promptly after discovery is concluded. We think the District Court may have given 
undue weight to the concern that a trial might generate unrelated civil actions that could con-
ceivably hamper the President in conducting the duties of his office. If and when that should oc-
cur, the court’s discretion would permit it to manage those actions in such fashion (including de-
ferral of trial) that interference with the President’s duties would not occur. But no such 
impingement upon the President’s conduct of his office was shown here. 
Id. 
128  Peter Baker & Helen Dewar, The Senate Acquits President Clinton, WASH. POST, Feb. 
13, 1999, at A1; A Chronology: Key Moments in the Clinton-Lewinsky Saga, CNN (last vis-
ited Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/resources/lewinsky/timeline/. 
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torate to lose faith in democracy.129 The Court gets an “F” in predictive abili-
ties, but an “A+” in denial capacity.130 
CONCLUSION 
Clapper creates what Justice Aharon Barak calls a “dead area,” one in 
which the government can act unlawfully without fear of being called to ac-
count.131 The Court implicitly acknowledges this when rejecting plaintiff’s ar-
gument that if they cannot pursue the litigation, there is no one else with ‘more 
standing’ who can,132 thus foreclosing judicial review of the profoundly im-
portant issues they seek to raise. 
Justice William O. Douglas lamented long ago that in the guise of standing 
“doctrine,” the Court reads certain complaints “with antagonistic eyes. . . . 
[But] the American dream teaches that if one reaches high enough and persists 
there is a forum where justice is dispensed. I would lower the technical barriers 
and let the courts serve that ancient need.”133 De Tocqueville’s famous observa-
tion134 that every significant disagreement in America ends in the courts needs 
modification—if a majority on the Supreme Court wants to adjudicate it. 
The five Republican appointees on the Court did agree to adjudicate 
George Bush’s quest for the presidency in 2000 even though as a candidate, he 
clearly had no standing to raise an equal protection claim on behalf of Florida 
voters.135 The Court adjudicated the reverse discrimination cases noted above 
even though those particular plaintiffs did not meet the usual requirements for 
standing. Yet it refused to reach the merits of the Clapper dispute, matters that 
go to the heart of the relationship between government and citizen, and in 
which the courts are the only meaningful avenue of redress from uncontrolled 
governmental overreaching. 
                                                        
129  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 359–60 (2010); see also 
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (striking down the aggregate 
limits on political contributions). 
130  See Richard L. Hasen, The Numbers Don’t Lie, SLATE (Mar. 9, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/03/the_supreme_court_s_citi 
zens_united_decision_has_led_to_an_explosion_of_campaign_spending_.html (document-
ing the massive increase in campaign contributions post-Citizens United, much coming from 
undisclosed donors). 
131  HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defence 42(2) PD 441 ¶ 25 [1988] (Isr.), in PUBLIC 
LAW IN ISRAEL, supra note 1, at 275, 287. 
132  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154 (2013). 
133  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518–19 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
134  “There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later 
turn into a judicial one.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (George 
Lawrence trans., J.P. Mayer ed., 1969). 
135  Mark S. Brodin, Bush v. Gore: The Worst (or at least second-to-the-worst) Supreme 
Court Decision Ever, 12 NEV. L.J. 563, 566 (2012). 
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As Gene Nichol pointed out thirty years ago,136 the Court has long manipu-
lated the redressability prong of standing doctrine, and it is even more telling 
today who the winners and losers of the game have been. The Court’s assertion 
that “[t]he doctrine of standing is ‘an essential and unchanging part of the case-
or-controversy requirement of Article III’ ”137 thus ranks as one of the more jar-
ring hypocrisies of recent jurisprudence. 
What began as an understandable prudential requirement that a plaintiff 
demonstrate “a personal stake [in the outcome of the case] sufficient to create 
concrete adverseness”138 and to ensure that “the legal questions presented to the 
court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but 
in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the conse-
quences of judicial action,”139 has become a wildly swinging door that conven-
iently closes on cases the Court would prefer not to consider. 
Restricting standing to pursue litigation in American courts is in stark con-
trast with the “discernible world-wide trend towards opening the doors of the 
court to every claimant.”140 The Supreme Court of Israel has, for example, sig-
nificantly narrowed its doctrines of nonjusticiability. Former Justice Aharon 
Barak explains that “when an important question of the rule of law comes up, we 
do not require standing. Everyone can come to the Court.”141 Canada takes a 
similar approach.142 Throughout Europe, standing has been extended over the 
past several decades to allow broad access to the courts by “public petitioner.”143 
                                                        
136  Nichol, supra note 58, at 79. 
137  Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 
656, 663 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560, (1992)). 
138  Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 56 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
139  Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). 
140  HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defence 42(2) PD 441 ¶ 18 [1988] (Isr.) (quoting HCJ 
566, 563/75 Ressler v. Minister of Finance 30 PD(2) 337 [1988] (Isr.)), in PUBLIC LAW IN 
ISRAEL, supra note 1, at 279. 
141  Aharon Barak, Some Reflections on the Israeli Legal System and Its Judiciary, 6.1 ELEC. 
J. COMPARATIVE L. (2002), http://www.ejcl.org/61/art61-1.html; see also Shimon Shetreet, 
Standing and Justiciability, in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 265 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat 
eds., 1996) (tracing the widening circle of standing to entertain questions of public import, 
and observing that “the right of standing is now given more or less to anyone who wants it”). 
Standing, as Justice Barak has observed, is a function of a judge’s philosophy of judi-
cial review: standing for a judge whose model is protecting individual rights is different than 
for a colleague with a model of preserving the legitimacy of official action. Ressler, 42(2) 
PD 441 ¶ 19. Where a petitioner raises a problem of a “salient constitutional character,” a 
direct personal stake in the outcome is not required—taxpayer status would suffice. Id. at 
282. Such an approach would almost certainly have conferred standing upon the Clapper 
plaintiffs. 
142  See Ressler, 42(2) PD 441 ¶ 22. Access to Canadian courts has been expanding for over 
twenty years. See Can. Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t & Immigration), 
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (Can.). In order to be granted public interest standing to challenge the 
validity of legislation, a Canadian plaintiff must simply show that there is a “serious issue” 
regarding the validity of the legislation and there is no other effective or reasonable way in 
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That our Supreme Court has restricted access to the federal dispute resolu-
tion system created by the Framers, in apparent conformity with the justices’ 
ideological, political, and economic agenda, is all the more disturbing. The 
conservative majority have acted like bouncers at an exclusive after-hours 
nightclub, admitting the recognizable VIPs, while turning away the rest. Or to 
return to the original metaphor, unwanted phone calls are simply screened out. 
A PERSONAL NOTE 
Hubert Humphrey used to say that when he felt down, he’d go to a union 
meeting (he of course lived during the height of the trade union movement). I 
felt the same electric energy at this symposium that Humphrey sought at gath-
erings of workers collectively pushing for a better workplace. To be in the 
presence of so many academics (young and not so young) deeply devoted to the 
preservation of a dispute resolution system that is fair, just, inclusive, and dem-
ocratic, was to me a profoundly uplifting moment. And for it to be in tribute to 
one of the dearest men ever to walk among us, who continually inspires us all 
to work toward that goal, was so fitting. Steve Subrin’s closing remarks about 
the sanctity of the jury trial were beyond moving, and demonstrate why he has 
had so profound an influence on so many. He is truly, in all senses, a mensch. 
                                                                                                                                
which the issue may be brought before the court, and that he is directly affected by the legis-
lation or that he has a “genuine interest” as a citizen in the validity of the legislation. Id. at 
238. This concept of public interest standing has also been extended to cases not involving a 
constitutional issue, even providing standing in situations where the plaintiff failed to meet 
the general standing requirements of the Canadian courts. Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Fi-
nance), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607 (Can.). 
143  VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 736 (2d ed. 
2006). Statutes in France and Germany give private organizations standing to sue on behalf 
of the interests of consumers and racial minorities. Id. at 736. In Italy, a 1973 Italian Court 
decision granted the analogue of the Sierra Club standing to sue the government in its own 
right to advocate for environmental conservation. Id. 
The expansion of citizens’ access to the courts has occurred on other continents as well. 
Id. at 712. In India, courts have loosened the rules of standing so much that there are no 
longer any real barriers to public interest litigants. Id. at 718. When an individual or class of 
individuals is unable to petition the courts on their own, any member of the public or a social 
action group is allowed to petition the courts for relief on their behalf. Id. at 712. Journalists, 
academics, social action organizations, and individuals have all initiated lawsuits on behalf 
of other individuals and groups. Id. at 718. 
The approach to standing in Japan is more comparable to the requirements in the United 
States. The plaintiff must show that his or her rights were infringed upon by some govern-
ment measure, and that he or she will gain a benefit from the reversal of the measure that 
caused the infringement. Id. The latter prong of the standing requirement can be much more 
difficult to prove, which is reflected by the small number of laws that have been considered 
unconstitutional in recent years. Id. 
